1. Newcomb's problem. 'Suppose a being in whose power to predict your choices you have enormous confidence. (One might tell a story about a being from another planet, with advanced technology and science, who you know to be friendly, etc.) You know that this being has often correctly predicted your choices in the past (and has never, so far as you know, made an incorrect prediction about your choices), and furthermore you know that this being has often correctly predicted the choices of other people, many of whom are similar to you, in the particular situation to be described below. One might tell a longer story, but all of this leads you to believe that almost certainly this being's prediction about your choice in the situation to be discussed will be correct.' 1 That situation is as follows. There are two boxes. One box is opaque. The other box is transparent and contains $1000. You have two options:
(O 1 ) Take only the opaque box ('one-boxing') 5 Proponents of this argument, and of the Causal Decision Theory underlying it, include Nozick (1969: 219-26) , Gibbard and Harper (1978: 361) , Skyrms (1980: 128-30) , Lewis (1981: 309) , Joyce (1999: 150-1) , Weirich (1998: 116-7; 2001: 126) and Sloman (2005: 90) . Egan (2007: 94-6) and Wedgwood (2013 Wedgwood ( : 2647 both endorse O 2 in Newcomb's problem but reject Causal Decision Theory for other reasons. 6 For the sake of clarity: when I say that the predictor is infallible, or that it is definitely right, or that you are entirely certain that it is right, I mean that you have Cr (S 1  O 1 ) = 1, where Cr is your subjective credence function (i.e. it is a probability function taking maximal value here). Similarly when I discuss 'Certainty Effect' in s. 4, I intend it to apply to cases in which we are explicitly told that the predictor is infallible, certainly correct etc. in the sense just outlined. 7 Be careful to distinguish what I am here calling infallibility (that the predictor is certainly in fact correct) from necessary infallibility (that the predictor is necessarily correct). We are given in the story that the prediction was made yesterday, and the point of this is supposed to be that the prediction was causally independent of your present choice. (At least this is so if we put aside Price's worry (2012: 510ff.) that this makes the story inconsistent.) It follows that the predictor is at best contingently correct; for if he is in fact correct, then had you chosen otherwise he would have been incorrect. (At least this is so on some non-'backtracking' interpretation of that counterfactual: see Lewis 1979: 33-5; cf. Horgan 1981: 162-5.) Hence he might easily have been wrong even if he is certainly in fact correct. One unfortunate complication of the literature is that although my usage is prevalent, some writers (e.g. Fischer (1994) ) use 'infallible' to mean necessary correctness.
Two further points on 'infallible': first, the distinction between necessary correctnesss and actual correctenss is quite different from the distinction between the normative and the descriptive This paper considers a package combining these responses. According to it, what you should do depends on your confidence that the predictor is right. If you are highly confident but not 100% confident that the predictor is right, you should two-box. But if you are completely confident of this, then you should onebox. Call this the Discontinuous Strategy (DS), it being discontinuous in the obvious sense that the number of boxes it recommends you take is a discontinuous function of your confidence in the predictor. The discontinuity is at the only plausible place in its neighbourhood that it could be.
8 It would be odd and clearly unmotivated suddenly to switch from two-boxing to one-boxing when your confidence in the predictor's being correct reaches 90%, or 95%, or 98.21653%. But for some reason it looks reasonable to switch at 100%.
What attraction the DS has is not dependent on the precise amounts of money involved, or on the fact that the prizes are monetary. But it does depend in part on the following: in decision theory. Newcomb's problem is a normative problem; but to say that the predictor is 'actually correct' is not to treat it as a descriptive one. The correctness of the predictor consists solely in the truth of its prediction and can be treated as exogenous in this problem. Newcomb's problem is a problem of rational choice only for the person facing the boxes, not for the predictor. To describe the predictor as certainly in fact correct is not to misapply descriptive decision theory but only to specify further what this normative problem involves. Second, one might question even whether a predictor who is infallible is possible. For instance, Ledwig and Spohn have both argued that for any predictor, one can always imagine a possible world in which that predictor predicts incorrectly (Ledwig 2000: 172) . At least in the modal system S5 it follows, and I agree, that a necessarily correct predictor is impossible. But this is consistent with the predictor's being infallible in the more restricted sense intended here, namely: that the agent has credence 1 that the predictor is actually if contingently correct on this occasion. 8 The point of 'in its neighbourhood' is to focus attention away from a discontinuity to which Evidential Decision Theory is independently committed. EDT endorses two-boxing if your confidence that the predictor is correct (i.e. your Cr (S 1 O 1 ) = Cr (S 2 O 2 )) is less than n 0 = def. (M + K) / 2M. But as soon as your confidence rises beyond that level, which is approximately 0.5, it abruptly switches to one-boxing. This discontinuity is both defensible and irrelevant.
( . Others have at least acknowledged the intuitive pull of the argument. 10 On the other hand, the position seems absurdly capricious.
[D]oes a proponent of taking what is in both boxes [given fallibility] (e.g., me) really wish to argue that it is the probability, however minute, of the predictor's being mistaken that makes all the difference? Does he really 9 E.g. Leeds (1984: 106) , Clark (2007: 143-4) , Hubin and Ross (1985: 439) . Bach (1987: 416) claims that most proponents of two-boxing against fallible predictors back off from this policy against infallible predictors. Leslie (1991: 73-4) says something similar, although he himself is a thoroughgoing one-boxer. More forthrightly, Levi (1975) writes that in Newcomb's problem as (under)-described above, you typically do not know what probabilities to apply, and so should follow a strategy like 'maximin' (which recommends two-boxing). But if you know that the predictor is in fact perfectly accurate then you should one-box. 10 E.g. Nozick (1969: 232 ; but see immediately below in the main text), Gibbard and Harper (1978: 370) and Seidenfeld (1984: 203 Nozick 1969: 232. 12 Two possible explanations of this have been suggested to me, namely (1) that people consider a probability of 1 as a qualitative difference whereas in fact it is only a quantitative one; (2) that people think that the Sorites paradox gets it all wrong that if one removes one grain of sand each time from a heap of 10,000,000 grains of sand, in the end one still does have a heap, because one grain of sand shouldn't make a difference. I think that (1) is not very far from my own story in s. 4: what I am adding is a more detailed account of how the difference 'between one in n and none in n' is 'qualitative' i.e. that it induces a discontinuity. As for (2): perhaps it is true that the best answer to the Sorites paradox is that one grain can make all the difference; but that leaves 3. The DS is irrational. To see why, suppose you accept it because you accept the CP. Now consider this variant of Newcomb's problem.
Two-Predictor Problem (2PP):
As before, you are facing two boxes, one opaque and one transparent. As before, you can take, and keep what is in, either the opaque box only, or that box and the transparent box. As before, the transparent box contains $1K. And as before, a predictor determined the contents of the opaque box in the usual manner.
But this time the predictor has been drawn by a weighted lottery from a pool of two predictors, the draw itself being both causally and stochastically independent of your choice. The lottery that determined the predictor was weighted towards Chas at a rate of n: 1-n (0 < n < 1). So you have confidence of n that on this occasion Chas was running the show. Should you one-box or two-box?
Note that although you are not certain who is doing the predicting, the CP still applies. To see this, define Z 1 (n) and Z 2 (n) as follows:
You get a free lottery ticket that pays out $1M with probability n.
Z 2 (n): You get a free lottery ticket that pays out $1M with probability 1-n, This is certainly equivalent to the lottery-ticket-plus-bonus Z 2 (n).
So in 2PP you are already certain that either you will choose O 1 and get Z 1 (n) or you will choose O 2 and get Z 2 (n). It follows from the CP that you should choose O 1 over O 2 if you prefer the first prize to the second:
Now clearly for any large enough n < 1 it is true that Z 1 (n)  Z 2 (n) i.e. that you, and anyone else who prefers more money to less, would prefer a ticket for a $1M lottery at odds of n: 1-n to a $1K bonus plus a ticket for that lottery at the opposite odds i.e. at odds of 1-n: n. After all, would you really exchange (i) this $1M in gilt-edged securities for (ii) $1K plus a ticket for a real national lottery, with a 1-in-a-million chance of winning? You would rather keep (i).
13 But (i) is just a lottery ticket with a very good chance of winning $1M, since there is a 1-in-amillion chance that the issuer will go bust tomorrow.
It follows from this fact and (2) that the CP recommends one-boxing in the two-predictor case for some n strictly less than one. Let n* < 1 be some such n.
In other words, if Cr is your subjective credence function, then the CP recommends O 1 in 2PP if Cr (C) = n*.
Holding on to the supposition that you follow the DS on the basis of the CP, consider now a standard Newcomb scenario with one fallible predictor. In particular its strike rate, so also your confidence that it is correct on this occasion, is the quantity n* from the previous example. Here you prefer ex hypothesi to two-box, because the DS recommends two-boxing against fallible predictors.
13 Obviously this is not so much an argument as an appeal to the reader's intuition. But it is possible to argue that for any risk averse subject who falls short of being infinitely risk averse, it is possible to choose an n < 1 such that the subject prefers (i) to (ii). For instance, suppose the subject to have a standard utility function for dollars U (z) = -e -Rz , R > 0 being the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk aversion. Then she prefers (i) to (ii) just in case n(1 -e -RM )(1 + e -RK ) > 1 -e -R(M + K) . This inequality always has a solution n < 1 for R < .
But this is inconsistent, for this standard scenario, and the 'variant'
involving Chas and Dave, are in fact one scenario described in two ways. The one predictor in the standard scenario is a person, Chas'n'Dave, who like all persons is an aggregate of momentary person-stages, some of which make predictions. The stages of this latter sort are themselves distributed across two temporally scattered objects. One of these, Chas, is the aggregate of those of Chas'n'Dave's temporal stages, past present and future, that make true predictions (i.e. predictions that are in fact fulfilled), these forming a proportion Cr (C) = n* of the stages of Chas'n'Dave that make any prediction at all. The other object, Dave, aggregates those temporal stages that make false predictions, these forming the remaining proportion 1-n* of the stages of Chas'n'Dave that make any prediction at all.
14 It was Chas'n'Dave himself, who gets it right n* times for every 1-n* times that he gets it wrong, who determined what is in the opaque box facing you now.
To say that is to say that you are facing a gamble, at odds of n*: 1-n*, that an infallible predictor rather than a hopeless one determined the contents of that box.
It follows that the Certainty Principle itself, which was supposed to help motivate the Discontinuous Strategy, actually conflicts with it. For the CP implies 14 It is true that in the situation that I described Chas and Dave are probably not distinct persons, although they may be, if (a) the Chas-stages are psychologically continuous with one another; and (b) so are the Dave-stages; but (c) the Chas-stages are not psychologically continuous with the Dave-stages. Certainly they are not temporally continuous persons. But nothing in Newcomb's problem, or in anyone's intuitions regarding it, or in any significant arguments concerning it, depends on the predictor's counting even as a person, let alone a temporally continuous one. If it could be the market (Broome 1989) , an alien being (Nozick 1969: 207) or even God (Craig 1987 , Resnik 1987 , then why couldn't it be a temporally scattered subpersonal aggregate of person-stages?
that when facing a fallible predictor in Newcomb's Problem you should one-box if your confidence that he has got it right exceeds n* < 1. This is straightforwardly inconsistent with the discontinuous strategy of one-boxing if and only if you are certain that the predictor is correct.
This leaves two options. First, you might reject the Certainty Principle.
Then the DS loses all motivation. In particular, nobody who felt sympathy for the two-boxing strategy against a fallible predictor has any further reason to doubt it when the predictor is known or certain to be right. The upshot is that you endorse two-boxing whether or not the predictor is infallible.
Second, you might accept the CP, and in particular that it applies, via (2), in favour of one-boxing even against a fallible predictor. In fact it supports oneboxing over two-boxing just in case your confidence in the predictor exceeds some n such that you would pay $1K to exchange a 1-n: n chance of winning $1M for an n: 1-n chance of winning $1M. On a natural assumption, your strategy is then indistinguishable from a purely evidentialist approach to the Newcomb problem. 15 But either way, the DS itself has got to go.
4. So why did it look so good? What difference between infallibility and nearinfallibility could explain whatever additional attraction one-boxing exerts upon 15 This is Evidential Decision Theory or EDT, as defended in its pure form in Jeffrey 1965. The 'natural assumption' is that your value for a lottery is its expected value. In that case and in Jeffrey's terminology, the CP demands one boxing just in case nV(M) > (1-n)V(M + K) + nV(K) i.e. iff Cr (S 1 O 1 ) V (M) > Cr (S 1 O 2 ) V (M + K) + Cr (S 2 O 2 ) V (K) i.e. iff EDT demands it. (Here I am writing V (X) for your news value for the proposition that you get $X and setting V (0) = 0.) In particular, if we assume that V (You get $X) = X then the CP demands one-boxing iff nM > (1-n)(M + K) + nK i.e. iff n > (M + K) / 2M = n 0 , as defined at n. 8. two-boxing always comes out better by $1K. But if we attend to (ii), then oneboxing can seem to do better than two-boxing by $1M to $1K. And the appeal of the DS arises from the fact that we mistakenly attend to (ii) when considering the perfect predictor case and so conclude that one-boxing is optimal there.
But this appears simply to shift the question: why, we want to ask, doesn't a similar confusion have a similar effect when the predictor is imperfect but still very good? And in any case, it isn't necessary to formulate the dominance argument in these counterfactual terms: all that is necessary to make it seem compelling is that (a) the content of the prediction is causally independent of your choice, and (b) two-boxing does better than one-boxing on either hypothesis about that content. This reasoning is not open to any such counterfactual fallacy as the confusion of (i) and (ii). But it too suffers a peculiar loss of force on the hypothesis of an infallible predictor.
Another possible explanation is that when we are certain that the predictor is infallible, we take the choice to exert a retrocausal effect on the prediction. In that case, the dominance argument fails to apply, since what you now do has an effect on the prediction. But it is implausible to suppose, as this explanation does, that an event has causal influence on whatever it makes certain. For instance, you might quite sensibly be completely certain that if this projectile escapes the Earth's gravitational pull then it was released at a speed exceeding 11km/s. But nobody thinks that the escape caused the release.
Let me turn to my own view. I suggest that the DS manifests an illusion of reason in which there is already good reason to believe. This is Certainty Effect:
a fixed reduction of the probability of an outcome has more impact when the outcome was initially certain than when it was initially probable.
The following two problems illustrate the effect. 'Each problem was presented to a different group of respondents. Each group was told that one participant in ten, preselected at random, would actually be playing for money.
Chance events were realized, in the respondents' presence, by drawing a single ball from a bag containing a known proportion of balls of the winning color, and the winners were paid immediately. The proportion of each group choosing each option is indicated in square brackets after that option.
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Looking at these data, what springs out is that whereas 1A is much more popular than 1B, 2A is slightly less popular than 2B. This suggests that many people prefer 1A to 1B and 2B to 2A. That is inconsistent. Consider:
Problem 3: Tomorrow one out of you and three others will be chosen at random to face Problem 1. But you must decide today what option to take if you happen to get picked. Which of the following options do you prefer?
3A. If you are picked to face Problem 1 take option 1A.
3B. If you are picked to face Problem 1 take option 1B.
Anyone who chooses 1A in Problem 1 should prefer 3A to 3B in Problem 3. If 1A
is right today then it is right tomorrow, assuming as we may that nothing about the problem has changed in the meantime. And if 1A is right in Problem 1 then it is right in Problem 1 whether or not you do in fact face it. That it is 3 to 1 that you won't face it does nothing to change the rationality of taking 1A if you face it.
But anyone who chooses 2B in Problem 2 should prefer 3B to 3A in problem 3. For Problem 3 is a realization of Problem 2: choosing option 3A in 16 Kahneman and Tversky 1981: 30 with trivial alterations.
Problem 3 gives you a 25% chance of winning $30 and choosing option 3B gives you a 20% chance of winning $45. (We can assume that in Problem 3, as in Problems 1 and 2, real money is involved in 10% of all cases.)
So anyone who chooses 1A in Problem 1 and 2B in Problem 2 is practically irrational in a way that would show up in Problem 3. The data suggest that probably there are many such people.
The explanation for this lapse of rationality is 'Certainty Effect', a phenomenon that Allais pointed out in his 1953 paper and which has since been well documented in humans and animals
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. To repeat: it is that a fixed reduction of the probability of an outcome has more impact when the outcome was initially certain than when it was initially probable.
It is easy to see this effect at work in the data. As we move from Problem 1 to Problem 2, the probability of getting $30 under the 'A' option in each problem falls by the same factor as the probability of getting $45 under the corresponding 'B' option (both fall by three-quarters). But this has a greater negative impact on the attractiveness of the 'A' option than on that of the 'B' option. On the present view of things, the 'A' option is then being rationally underweighted relative to the 'B' option. Certainty Effect is a widespread form of practical irrationality.
Let us apply it to explain the attractiveness of the DS. 18 What makes the Newcomb Problem troublesome is that two intuitive motivations that normally 17 E.g. Shafir et al. 2008. 18 An obvious problem with this strategy is that it seems illegitimately to confuse descriptive with normative approaches to decision theory. Certainty Effect is a matter of descriptive psychology (this is something that people actually do) whereas Newcomb's Problem is a problem in the normative theory: should you one-box or two-box? It is true that this paper uses both normative and descriptive arguments, but it segregates their applications. The purely normative argument of s. 3 is directed at question (A) and aims to establish the normative conclusion that you should not work together are here in conflict. 1999: 146-54) , some philosophers have gone deeper, claiming that the alleged opposition between causal and evidential approaches can be overcome given either (i) a clearer sense of the internal evidence available to the deliberator (Eells 1982: ch. 7-8) , ss. 7.3-4) . On the other hand, you needn't agree with me on this point to accept my main argument, which does not rely on the truth of the Certainty Principle but only on its inconsistency with the DS. The position of this paper is that since the DS is inconsistent with its own sole motivation, namely the CP, it cannot be rational to accept the DS, whatever you think about the CP. (Thanks to a referee.) most people; certainly this will be true for anyone to whom the DS seems attractive. 21 The following explanation then applies to those people.
Notice that Certainty Effect predicts an abrupt variation in the strength of the E-motive as we move from the case where the predictor is infallible to the case where he is (merely) very accurate. In particular consider these three cases (in (b) and (c) we take N to be the same very large quantity):
(a) Newcomb's Problem with an infallible predictor (b) Newcomb's Problem but the predictor has a strike rate of (N-1) / N (c) Newcomb's Problem but the predictor has a strike rate of (N-2) / N The C-motive to two-box remains equally strong in all cases. In (a) the E-motive to one-box is maximally strong: here the conditional probability of being a millionaire given that you one-box is 1. In (b) that conditional probability has fallen to (N-1) / N and in (c) it has fallen further, to (N-2) / N.
Certainty Effect predicts that the move from (a) to (b) has more negative impact on the strength of the E-motive than the move from (b) to (c).
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21 So I am here supposing that most of us do in fact respond to a probabilistically weighted combination of decision-theoretic motivations in something like the manner recommended in Nozick 1993 Part II. It is a nice question whether people should rationally have such a mixed response to these mixed motives. Fortunately, I can set aside that task the purely descriptive purposes of this section. (For more on the division of descriptive/normative labour in this paper, see n. 18 above.) 22 It might concern you that I am not comparing like with like: in the move from option 1A to option 2A the associated chance fell by the same multiplicative factor as in the move from option 1B to option 2B. But in the move from case (a) to case (b) the associated probability fell by the same Equivalently, the move from (b) to (a) has more positive impact on the E-motive than what ought rationally to be the equally significant move from (c) to (b). So if Certainty Effect is strong enough then you would expect the E-motive to jump discontinuously in strength between (b) and (a), and so be strong enough to outweigh the C-motive in (a) but not in ( the predictor is known to be highly reliable but never assumed to be perfect.
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additive increment as in the move from (b) to (c). But if N is large then this difference is insignificant, since in that case ((N-1) / N) 2  (N-2) / N, and so the factor by which the predictor's strike rate in (b) exceeds that in (c) is roughly equal to the factor by which the strike rate in (a) (=1) exceeds that in (b). 23 I should here explicitly acknowledge what will anyway be obvious, that the psychological source of this intuitive illusion is really an empirical matter that could only be decisively settled by experiment. But this section was written entirely from an armchair. Let me give two excuses for that. First: to my knowledge nobody has ever posited, let alone tested, any explanation of why the DS is intuitively plausible. So even from the armchair it is possible to advance matters by positing one. Second: there is in the nature of infallible Newcomb cases some difficulty in testing the relative strength of E-motives and C-motives. It may be hard to get anyone to believe that somebody else is a very accurate predictor of her choice. How could you ever convince someone that the predictor is infallible? Perhaps this explains the dearth of even aspirationally rigorous studies of intuition in this special case (Anand 1990 being the only one known to me). In any case it makes it plausible that the present enquiry is best pursued, because only pursuable, from the armchair.
